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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Formerly, where a business was carried on by'a husband and wife,
the presumption was, the business was owned by the husband and a
co-partnership did not exist. But where a husband knowingly holds
himself out as a partner with a wife, he is estopped to deny the exist-
ence of a partnership.
Section 6.oI5 Wisconsin Statutes holds "women shall have the same
rights and privileges under the law as men in the exercise of suffrage,
freedom of contract . . . . and in all other respects. The various
courts, executive, and administrative officers shall construe the statutes
where masculine gender is used, to include feminine, unless such con-
struction will deny to females the special protection and privileges
which they.now enjoy for the general welfare."
This section seems to be a blanket provision whereby a married
woman may contract as a feme sole. This construction permits a
married woman to contract with whom she may choose. Thus a mar-
ried woman in Wisconsin, under this section, has the right to contract
with her husband as a co-partner in a business.
PATRICIA RYAN
Practice: Judgments: Power of Trial Court to Set Aside After
Expiration of Term.
In Fishbeck v. Mielenz1 it is held that a valid judgment cannot be
set aside after the term at which it is entered except under the pro-
visions of Section 269.46 Statutes. After the end of the term and
within the expiration of one year after the moving party had notice
of the judgment, the circuit court may correct mistakes in the entry
thereof, conforming it to the judgment pronounced, but it cannot
modify or amend the judgment. (Ibid.)
The very recent case Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Rellstab2 decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States throws an interesting light
on the power of the District Court to set aside a judgment on the
ground of perjured testimony after expiration of the term. In De-
cember, 1921, one Ginsberg recovered judgment against the petitioner
in this case for injuries to himself and a minor son and for the death
of another son, caused by a collision at a crossing, between the plain-
tiff's truck and one of the petitioner's trains. The trial and the giving
of judgment took place in the District Court. Later, on the evidence
of two important witnesses, husband and wife, the judgment was set
aside because said witnesses had committed perjury. A new trial was
had and judgment was rendered for the defendant, the present pe-
titioner. The judgment was entered on June 21, 1923. Plaintiff ap-
pealed but the Circuit Court of Appeals3 affirmed the judgment on
March 21, 1924. The witnesses who had testified for the plaintiff at
the first trial testified for the defendant at the second, and after the
term of the District Court in which the foregoing steps had been taken
had expired, without being extended in any form, the husband, under
affidavit, stated that the testimony given by him at both trials was
false and that in fact he knew nothing of the matter. With this dis-
closure, the trial judge, the Honorable John Rellstab, was applied to,
1 162 Wis. 12, 154 N.W. 7oi.
'72 L. ed. 228.
1296 Fed. 439.
NOTES AND COMMENT
and after hearing testimony in open court, he made an order on May
9, 1925, wherein he purported to set aside the judgment that had been
affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. Petitioners thereupon applied
to the circuit court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to reinstate
the judgment but that court held that it had no jurisdiction in the case.4
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the holding of
the circuit court of appeals and held that the writ prayed for should
issue. The court says:
However strong may have been the convictions of the district judge that
injustice would be done by inforcing the judgment, he could not set it aside
on the ground that the testimony of admitted perjurers was perjured also at
the second trial. The power of the court to set aside its judgment on this ground
ended with the term.
The court cites Re Metropolitan Trust Company,5 wherein it was held
that mandamus is the proper remedy where a Federal circuit court
has exceeded its power by vacating a judgment after the term. The
court, in the case under discussion, held that the District Court was
without jurisdiction to vacate the judgment and that mandamus was
the proper remedy and that the circuit court of appeals had power
to issue such a writ. The court said that the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was an appellate court and as such had the power to require its
judgment to be enforced. Re Potts.6 In McClelland v. Carland7 it
was held that mandamus may be issued by a circuit court of appeals
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The court concluded the decision
by saying again that the District Court "made an unwarranted attempt
to set aside a judgment which it had no jurisdiction to touch."
SAM GOLDENBERG
Practice: Special Verdict: Contributory Negligence.
A decision of great importance and interest has been recently handed
down by the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin in reviewing the
case of Berrafato v. Exner.1 There were two separate and distinct
actions brought by two plaintiffs against the defendant Exner, to re-
cover damages sustained as a result'of an automobile collision on a
highway. The plaintiff Berrafato was riding in the automobile which
was then and there owned and operated by the Plaintiff Harvey, and
sustained personal injuries by reason of the collision. The cases were
tried together and one verdict was returned covering the issues in both
cases.
The jury found in answering the questions in the special verdict,
that the defendant's excessive speed and failure to yield one-half of
the roadway constituted the proximate cause of the collision. However,
there was a manifest inconsistency in the verdict relating to the negli-
gence of the two plaintiffs. The jury found that Berrafato, who was
a passenger and had nothing to do with the driving or managing of
the car, was guilty of negligence in his failure to keep a proper look-
'15 F. (2d) 137.
5218 U.S. 312, 321, 54 L. ed. 1051, 1055, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18.
166 U.S. 263 41 L. ed. 994, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 520.
:217 U.S. 268, 54 L. ed. 762, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 501.
1 Berrafato v. Exner, 216 N.W. 165; Harvey v. Exner, 216 N.W. 165.
